What About That Advisory System?

October / November 2009 Volume 7 Number 5

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As you may have noticed, there have been problems with the Homeland Security Advisory System that has been employed in every U.S. airport. The problems have been around since the system was launched shortly after 9/11. The Homeland Security Advisory Council in September released its task force report that offers some recommendations to DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano. Here they are:

I. Threshold Conclusions
—€ The task force believes that, with reform, the advisory system should remain exclusively focused on the threat of terrorism to the United States.
—€ The task force viewed with concern the vulnerabilities with the current advisory system: An erosion of public confidence in and respect for the current system, a frustration that the information provided with each alert is insufficient and unactionable, a concern that alerts are overly broad and insufficiently targeted on specific region and sector, a reluctance of the government to bring down color alert status after it has been elevated—€”leading to public cynicism about the color status.

II. Fuller Disclosure
—€ Consistent with national security, alerts issued by the secretary should provide the fullest degree of information possible. The secretary should consider, consistent with national security concerns, the declassification and disclosing of: specific detail of the threat information ( e.g. credible, specific, actionable), region and sector most affected, level of credibility and confidence in the threat information, steps government is taking to respond to the threat, protective measures public can take, places to go to get more information and when and how the government will keep public updated
—€ During periods of threat, communications from the secretary or her designate should be ongoing and regular. The secretary's public communications should be coordinated and consistent with state and local officials and first responders.
—€ Whatever threat alert system is adopted, the federal government­—€”across agencies—€”would benefit from a common vocabulary: exactly what each level of threat means to the general public.

III. Fullest Transparency
—€ Consistent with national security, DHS should offer the greatest transparency possible on the process by which alert decisions have been made:
What has triggered the alert? Who has been involved in the considerations? Who has made the final decision? And the complete absence of political interest in the decision process.
—€ The new "baseline" for the United States is an attentive, "guarded" state. For reasons of public credibility—€”and public and industry expenditure—€”the secretary should elevate the threat status only when compelled to do so in the interest of public safety and security. To the extent possible, the nation should be managed at a guarded state.
—€ When public security merits an increase in threat status, the secretary should target that higher alert level, as best possible, on the specific location and the specific sector at risk.
—€ To retain credibility with the general public, the threat level of the country must be regularly reassessed and lowered when practicable and consistent with the available threat information. The secretary should consider various "forcing mechanisms" to encourage default to a guarded status following periods of elevated concern.
—€ More generally, the secretary should consider a practice of "debriefs" explaining recent threats and what has become of them.

IV. Recommendations Specific to the General Public
—€ The task force recommends the Homeland Security Advisory System retain some form of targeted risk communication to the public should a "terrorist alert" be announced.
There was no consensus over whether this should be a graduated, easily recognized code system that can convey, in an instant, a change in the level of concern or a simpler, more-flexible system of targeted warnings that easily would be understandable, credible, and actionable by the public.
Some task force members felt strongly that the public alerts be consistent with, but bifurcated from, preparedness, readiness alerts for institutions. While the task force did not think terrorist alerts should be integrated with natural disasters, some task forces members did believe that the form of terrorist alert should mirror the kinds of alerts and warnings issued for natural disasters and public safety concerns. Several examples were discussed, yet the task force was deadlocked on whether to retain colors going forward.
—€ Recognizing the new baseline for the United States is "guarded," the task force recommends the alert system be reduced to three levels. This simplification is intended to enhance, even if in reasonably modest measure, public confidence in the credibility of the system.
—€ The graduated alert status is not a substitute for the fuller disclosure of information recommended above. If anything, it should be the lesser part of the secretary's communication to the nation.
—€ Since 9/11, a revolution has upended media and communications; the Homeland Security Advisory System should stay current with the communications revolution and adopt an "all tools" approach in reaching the general public. In addition to conventional media, this approach should encompass:
New media generally (i.e. Twitter, Facebook, MySpace, Wikis, etc.), bloggers, social media, delivery through PDAs, public sign-up for online/PDA alerts.